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NOTES
COMMUNITY PROPERTY: NECESSARY PARTIES TO ACTIONS CONCERNING
COMMUNITY REALTY.-In Babbitt v. Babbitt1 the Supreme Court of California held
that a wife could recover community real property which had been the subject of
litigation between the husband and a third party, where judgment in that action
had been adverse to the husband. This presents the question as to what are the
rights of a wife in actions regarding community real property where she is not named
as a party.
Babbitt v. Babbitt was an action for divorce, on grounds of adultery and cruelty,
by wife against husband. Prior to the divorce the husband had been living with
another woman (hereafter called Agnes), and had purchased a house in which they
lived together. Title to this house was taken in Agnes' name. Although there was a
dispute as to the proportion of the purchase price furnished by the husband, there
was no question that whatever funds he did put into the house were funds which
belonged to the husband-wife community, or that title was taken in Agnes' name to
secrete the transaction from the wife, or that Agnes was at all times aware of the
husband's existing marriage. The wife joined Agnes as a party defendant in the
divorce action on the theory that she was holding this real property in trust for the
community.
The fact situation which gives this case its distinctive flavor is that prior to the
divorce Agnes had decided that she could do without the further companionship of
our errant husband, and she brought a suit in ejectment to oust him from the
property in question, claiming it as her own.2 He contested this action, and in his
cross-complaint alleged that he had agreed to purchase the property and put it in her
name, in reliance on her statements that she would convey to him on his request,
and further that he paid for the property but she intended to defraud him of it.3
Agnes answered the cross-complaint, averring that she had paid part of the purchase
price out of her earnings and separate property, and asked for an accounting to
determine their respective interests in the property. While the action was pending,
the parties stipulated that a judgment be entered that each of them take a one-half
interest in the property, and judgment was so entered. When Agnes was named
co-defendant in the divorce action, she entered this judgment as a bar to proceedings
against her. Her theory was that since the community property was under the manage-
ment and control of the husband, he represented the community in an action at
law, and consequently the wife's interests were determined simultaneously with his.
Initially it must be determined whether the husband alone can represent the com-
munity in an action at law. If he can, then, even though the wife is not named as
a party, she is a party in legal effect. Whether she was a party or a stranger to the
ejectment action was determinative of her power to rebut Agnes' alleged defense
raised in the divorce action. In deciding whether or not she had been a party to
the prior action the court divided 4 to 2, in the wife's favor.
The majority of the court felt that the wife was not a party to the former suit,
and therefore held that it was proper for her to present evidence as to the entire
transaction-the original purchase, the intent of the parties in taking title in Agnes'
name, and the amount of consideration contributed by each toward the purchase
price of the house.
144 Cal.2d 289, 282 P.2d 1 (1955).
2 Proceedings No. COC 313, Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Compton Branch (June
4,1952).
'CALIF. CIV. CODE § 853 recognizes resulting trusts. Query: Would the court have enforced
this resulting trust since its object was illegal?
(198)
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Those joining in the dissenting opinion felt that as long as the marital relationship
existed the community property was under the management and control of the
husband, and that the wife was a party to the prior suit by the nature of her com-
munity property relationship with her husband. She would, therefore, be bound by
the judgment in any action by or against her husband in regard to the community
property, unless she could prove that obtaining the judgment itself was a fraud on
her interests. Thus she would be limited to showing how the judgment was obtained,
i.e. by collateral or extrinsic fraud, and could not include a showing of facts on
which the judgment was based; or, as declared in Anderson v. Bank of Lassen:4
"A judgment may be attacked in equity for fraud in its procurement where the juris-
diction of the court has been imposed upon, or the prevailing party, by some extrinsic
and collateral fraud has prevented a fair submission of the controversy, or where the
fraud was practiced in the very act of obtaining the judgment." 5
This she failed to do, so the dissenting judges felt she was bound by the judgment
against the husband, and could not recover the one-half interest in the house which
had been awarded to Agnes.
To determine which of these two views is preferable, we must examine applicable
statutes and judicial opinions.
For the purposes of this discussion, community property may be defined as all
property, both real and personal, acquired after marriage by either husband or wife
which is not acquired as the separate property of either. 6 The husband and wife are
members of a "community" created by their marriage contract. It has been described
thus:
"The husband is neither agent nor trustee of the wife, but he is head of the marital
community. The real character of his managerial capacity is historical and harks back to
his protective position as head of the ancient family. Both the husband and wife have
equal rights to possession of the community property, but the wife's possession is through
her husband as head of the community."T
California Civil Code section 172a provides that the husband has the manage-
ment and control of the community real property, limited only by the provision that
the wife must join with him in executing any instrument by which such community
real property is leased for more than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered.
By judicial interpretation, the power to represent the community in legal actions
involving community property is included within the power of the husband to manage
and control. Richards, J., in Cutting v. Bryan,8 has stated what seems to be the
general rule:
. ..the husband of the plaintiff was the principal party defendant in such action,
and as such was representing the community interest of himself and also of his wife in
said property, and that as to such interest the plaintiff herein was in privity with her
husband and was represented in said action by him as fully as though she had been
expressly made a party thereto."
Such is the control of the husband over the community property that it is not
interrupted even by divorce proceedings unless there has been a division of the com-
munity property.9 Since the power to represent the community in litigation is one
of the incidents of his power to manage and control the community real property, it
would also continue until divorce is final. Section 161a was added to the California
' 140 Cal 695, 74 Pac. 287 (1903)5Id. at 698, 74 Pac. at 287.
'CALIF. CIV. CoDE § 164.
714 CALIF. STATE BAR JOURNAL 9, 16 (1939).
8 206 CaL. 254, 258, 274 Pac. 326, 328 (1929).
' Chance v. Kobsted, 66 CalApp. 434, 226 Pac. 632 (1924).
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Civil Code in 1927, and it gives the wife a present, existing and equal interest in the
community property during the continuance of the marriage relation. Prior to this
addition the husband was taxable on the entire income of the community on the
theory that the wife did not have a vested interest. This addition by the Legislature
says that she does have a present interest. There has been some speculation as to what
effect the courts may give this section in cases like the present, but so far no change
is indicated. Since the principal purpose behind the enactment of the section was to
allow husband and wife each to declare half of the community income to get the
benefits of a lower income tax bracket, thereby achieving equal treatment under the
revenue laws for California residents with those of other community property states,
it is not probable that the courts will treat it as effecting a change in the wife's standing
as a necessary party in litigation.10
Since it is not necessary to name a wife as a party in al action concerning
community property because the husband alone is capable of representing the interests
of the entire community, the wife should be estopped from further litigation on the
same issues with the original adverse party. To give force and effect to the settlements
worked out in our courts, it is agreed that their decision must end any particular
dispute. Of course, the parties have a right to appeal their case until it has reached
the highest court of review, but after that decision, the same parties may never again
litigate the same issues. This is the rule of res judicata-a matter settled. The Restate-
ment of the Law of Judgments"l states:
"Where a judgment is rendered in an action in which a party thereto properly acts
on behalf of another, the other is bound by and entitled to the rules of res judicata with
reference to such interests as at the time are controlled by the party to the action."
1 2
Similarly, California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1908, 1910 and 1911,
when read together, say that a judgment in an action before a court having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is conclusive between those persons who are on the
opposite sides of the controversy, and upon the matters which appear from the face
of the judgment to have been adjudged. If these rules of law are applied to Babbitt v.
Babbitt, it would appear that when the action in ejectment was brought against the
husband, he fully represented the interests of the community in the action, and that
the judgment granting a one-half interest to Agnes would be conclusive as to further
action by either husband or wife against her.
Since the majority of the court felt that these usual rules were not applicable to
Babbitt v. Babbitt, what facts are present which justify their decision?
Although, strictly speaking, the relationship of husband to wife in his manage-
ment and control of the community property is neither that of agent nor of trustee,
it is of a fiduciary character. 13 There are fairly well-defined limits within which any
fiduciary can act and have his actions legally recognized as those of a fiduciary.
When he steps over these bounds, he is no longer acting in his fiduciary capacity, but
for himself alone, and such ultra vires acts are not effective to bind the interests of
those he purports to represent. Intentional fraud on the part of the fiduciary is one
such boundary. If the husband, as a representative of the husband-wife community,
engages in any transaction intended to defraud the wife of her share of the community
property, he is surely breaching his fiduciary duty, and cannot be considered to be
representing the community.
1042 CALIF. L. REV. 368, 373 (1954).
"RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942).
Id. § 85.
"Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal.App. 443, 205 P.2d 402 (1949). In this case the court actually
calls the husband a "trustee."
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This gives us two fixed points of reference:
1. Where the husband properly (honestly even though unwisely) manages the
community property, the wife cannot be heard to complain.
2. Where the husband deliberately acts to defraud or cheat or otherwise illegally
deprive the wife of her rights, he would be acting outside of his statutory power to
manage and control; i.e., he would be acting for himself, and not for the community.
If he is not acting for the community, it follows that his actions would not be binding
on the wife merely because of her membership in the community.
The facts in the case of Babbitt v. Babbitt are not squarely in point with either
of these two positions. The original transaction of converting community funds into
a house with title in Agnes' name was, by admission of the husband, done to keep
the property away from his wife. At this point he was acting against the interests
of the community, and the wife would have been able to avoid the transfer. However,
two years later when Agnes and the husband met as plaintiff and defendant in the
ejectment action, there is nothing to indicate that it was not a bona fide adversary
action. They were thoroughly at war with each other, and each was trying his best
to oust the other completely. Was the husband, in his efforts to reclaim the title
(or salvage what he could), acting for himself or for the community? Granted that
any property coming to him by judgment in the action would be community property
by virtue of his continuing marital status, it is not reasonable to say that he is auto-
matically reinstated as representative of the community when he is dealing with the
same party and the same parcel of realty that was involved in the original fraud.
It would be even less reasonable when the original fraudulent parties had come to an
out-of-court settlement and entered a stipulated judgment dividing that property. The
majority of the court looked at these facts and found that:
"The stipulated judgment in the ejectment action could not be disentangled from
the fraudulent relationship of the parties thereto and it was but another step in the
conspiracy between the husband and Agnes to deprive the wife of her property rights ....
The agreed judgment was in effect merely a compromise among wrongdoers in a contro-
versy between themselves as to a division of the spoils."'14
From this conclusion that the husband was not acting for the community, it
logically followed that the wife was not bound by his actions or the judgment against
him, and could put the title to the whole of the house in issue again. By a finding
of fact in her favor, she became the owner of the whole.
This decision places no new restrictions on the power of the husband to manage
and control the community property, for the decision plainly turns on the issue of
fraud and not on the fact that the wife was not named as a party to the ejectment
action. It should be remembered that there is no necessity for a continued harmonious
relationship between husband and wife to vitalize the husband's right to manage and
control community property. It should also be noted that this decision is limited to
one item only of the Babbitts' community property. If they had owned other parcels
of real or personal property, there is no inference to be drawn from this decision
that the court would say the other property was withdrawn from the husband's power
to control because of his fraud with regard to this one parcel. It is possible that the
court would have taken a different view of the facts if the ejectment action had been
allowed to go to a trial and the judgment there had been based on the facts produced,
rather than reached by stipulation between the original fraudulent parties.
In summary, the wife is still an unnecessary party to legal actions involving
community real property in California. The husband alone represents the community.
"' See note 1 supra at 292, 282 P.2d at 3.
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